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Education Corruption, Reform, and Growth: 
Case of Post-Soviet Russia 
 
This paper investigates a possible impact of education corruption on economic growth in 
Russia. It argues that high levels of education corruption may harm total factor productivity in 
the long run, primarily through lowering the level of human capital and slowing down the pace 
of its accumulation. Ethical standards learned in the process of training in universities can also 
affect the standards of practice in different professions. The growing level of productivity is not 
likely to reduce education corruption in the short run, but can eventually lead to implementation 
of higher ethical standards in the education sector. 
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Introduction 
The impact of education corruption on economic growth remains in the realm of 
speculations and some theorizing. There is a lot of research done on human capital, education, 
economic development, and growth. There is also a substantial bloc of literature on corruption 
and economic development and growth. This bloc of scholarly literature, however, is represented 
mostly by theoretical works. Few empirical works are produced so far, primarily due to the lack 
of data. Reliability and validity of the existing scarce data on governance and corruption also 
remains an issue. We target education corruption, human capital, and growth in Russia and offer 
examples from other New Independent States (NIS). More specifically, we look at corruption in 
education and at its possible implications for economic growth in Russia. We consider specific 
aspects of education corruption and its probable impact on growth. These aspects include 
interactions between education corruption and total factor productivity and interactions between 
corruption and structure of the national economy. Education corruption may be harmful for 
productivity while higher productivity may reduce education corruption. Education corruption 
may to a certain extent define or influence the structure of the national economy. Corruption in 
the education sector may be reduced through the changes in the economic structure. All of these 
are rather mere speculations or hypotheses to be researched than definitive statements. The areas 
to be touched upon are the education sector, labor market, level of concentration of property 
rights, and distribution of property rights on the means of production. 
 
Corruption and economic growth 
Corruption is a growing problem in Russia and receives more attention now than ever 
before. According to some estimates, transition economies are believed to be among the leaders 
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in terms of corruption. The surveys conducted by Transparency International and by the World 
Bank picture Russia as a very corrupt country. According to the Corruption perceptions index 
(CPI), developed and calculated annually by Transparency International, Russia was 79rd out of 
91 countries surveyed in 2001. In 2008, Russia was in 147th place with the score of 2.1, out of 
180 countries, sharing the neighborhood with such countries, as Kenya and Syria (Transparency 
International, 2008). CPI score relates to perceptions of the degree of corruption as seen by 
business people and country analysts, and ranges between 10 (highly clean) and 0 (highly 
corrupt). The lower the numerical value of the country’s score, the higher is the level of 
corruption in the country. 
All-Russian Center for Research of Public Opinion (VCIOM) conducted a study of 
corruption perceptions among Russians at the end of 2008. 30 percent of the respondents marked 
the level of corruption as very high, while another 44 percent as high. 19 percent considered it as 
average and only 1 percent as low. The most corrupt in people’s minds are traffic police (33 
percent), local authorities (28 percent), police (26 percent), healthcare (16 percent), and 
education (15 percent). 52 percent of the respondents had experiences of giving money or gifts to 
medical professionals while 36 percent made informal payments to educators (Leonidov, 2009). 
According to the data, presented by the Attorney General, major corruptioners in Russia are 
college faculty, school teachers, policemen, and doctors, but not state bureaucrats. The number 
of corrupt civil servants does not correlate directly with their total number or the level of region’s 
economic development. The number of reported cases of corruption in Russia continues to grow. 
There were 12.5 thousand cases of bribery reported in 2008. It is a 7.7 percent increase as 
compared to 2007. The number of recorded abuses of public office in 2008 has reached 43.5 
thousand, i.e. an 11.4 percent increase since 2007. The number of bribes in business, however, 
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has declined 23.8 percent, down to 1712 cases. Police investigators turned to courts 27.4 percent 
less cases of corruption in 2008, than they did in 2007. For investigators of the prosecutor’s 
department this decline is equal to 4.5 percent (Newsru.com, May 5, 2009). Despite all the claims 
of the authorities about the uncompromising fight against corruption, the real numbers show 
opposite trends. 
Over 80 percent of all of those sentenced for bribery received less than $1000 in illicit 
payments. There are only 189 court sentences handed in 2008 to bureaucrats of all levels, 
including federal, regional, and municipal level bureaucrats. The categories are prosecuted for 
bribe receiving. The majority of those prosecuted for bribe giving consists of drivers. They 
rutinely pay bribes to the traffic police officers. However, when the police officers are on watch 
by their own controllers, they may arrest a driver for the offer of a bribe and send him/her to 
court. Such a statistics is very surprising since one would expect businessmen constitute the bulk 
of those who pay pribes and, under the effective anti-corruption campaign, prosecuted for bribe 
giving. Apparently, it is not the case. Chair of the non-governmental organization against 
corruption, Kirill Kabanov, says that the government only catches thsoe corruptioners who are 
easy to catch. He also believes that more than half of all the court cases against corruptioners are 
a result of mere provocation. Street level civil servants are a major target for anti-corruption 
campaigns, not even street level bureaucrats (Kornya, Holmogorova, and Nikol’skij, 2009). 
Rose-Ackerman (1978) considers corruption as an “allocative mechanism” for scarce 
resources. The state monopolizes certain allocative functions, be it permissions and licenses, or 
access to public services. State officials’ profiteering is based on abuse of their discretionary 
powers and monopolistic positions. Referring to Klitgaard (1988, p. 23) Gong states that 
corruption: “than occurs when an agent betrays the principal’s interests in pursuit of his/her own 
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or when the client corrupts the agent “if he or she (client) perceives that the likely net benefits 
from doing so outweigh the likely net costs” (Gong, 2002, p. 88) According to the “grease-the-
wheels” concept of corruption, it helps overcome bureaucratic obstacles that remain from the 
previous regime. This may be especially true for Russia during the transition period of 1990s. 
There are some methodologies that allow approaching the issue of corruption and measuring it 
(see, for instance, Bellver and Kaufmann, 2005; Besançon, 2003; Kaufmann and Kraay, 2003; 
Osipian, 2007a), including legalistic (Kaufmann and Vicente, 2005; Osipian, 2009e; Zimring and 
Johnson, 2005) and economic ones (Kaufmann et.al., 2000; Rose-Ackerman, 1978, 1999). 
Lancaster and Montinola (1997) suggest that studies of corruption should assess rival 
explanations. 
Svensson (2005) notes that it might be true higher wages for bureaucrats reduce 
corruption, but there is not enough evidence to support it (pp. 32-33). According to the data 
analysis, presented by Shleifer and Treisman (2003, pp. 27-28), administrative corruption is very 
high in poor countries of the former Soviet Union, such as Uzbekistan, Armenia, and Azerbaijan, 
lower in the Russian Federation, Bulgaria, and Lithuania, and even lower in relatively wealthy 
Hungary and Slovenia. Individuals’ perceptions about corruption put Russia lower than 
Argentina, Brazil, Romania, or Lithuania. Svensson (2005) notes that “All of the countries with 
the highest levels of corruption are developing or transition countries. Strikingly, many are 
governed, or have recently been governed, by socialist governments.” (p. 24) Referring to the 
works of Lipset (1960), Demsetz (1967), and Glaeser, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Schleifer 
(2004), the author points out that higher per capita income and higher level of human capital 
reduce corruption. 
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The Ministry of Justice is composing a list of most “corruptible” public offices, first of all 
those with high discretionary authorities over big funds and projects. These offices will be taken 
under special control. The Minister of Justice, Aleksandr Konovalov, emphasises transparency 
and accountability. He also suggests new organizational technologies and electronic decision-
making (Savel’eva, 2008). Russian Prime Minister, Vladimir Putin, signed the order About the 
methodology of conducting an expert examination of the projects of laws and other legal 
documents with the goal of identifying sections and regulations that have a potential to facilitate 
corruption (Putin, 2009). Despite governmental efforts, 58 percent of Russians think that it is 
impossible to annihilate corruption. The major causes of corruption are greediness and low moral 
standards (44 percent of the respondents) and ineffective government and legislation (34 percent 
of the respondents). Only 18 percent of Russians see themselves as the cause of corruption due to 
their low legal culture and legal nihilism (Newsru.com, April 28, 2009). 
The Minister of The Interior, Rashid Nurgaliev, uses some very vague estimates, based 
on surveys and other small scale sociological studies, to report the annual damage from 
corruption on a scale of 40 billion rubles, or around $1.5 billion. This sum is not that large for a 
country with the annual GDP of around $2 trillion, as measured in the nominal USD. Over 56 
percent of businessmen reported paying bribes to state bureaucrats. According to the 
representative survey, conducted by the New Russia Barometer in 2007, 86 percent of Russians 
believe that the police itself are all corrupt from top to down, even though only 5 percent of the 
respondents acknowledged facing corruption in police (Samofalova, 2008). 
The National Anticorruption Committee estimates the total corruption market at $300 
billion. 40 to 60 percent of this total consists of kickbacks paid by businesses to public 
bureaucrats in exchange for governmental contracts and concessions (Newsru.com, March 17, 
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2009). The numbers are impressive, but the sources and credibility of such estimates are not 
clear. Russian President Dmitry Medvedev took on corruption seriously: bureaucrats who hide 
their incomes should be fired immediately (Newsru.com, March 10, 2009). However, Russians 
are not very interested in their public officials’ incomes, 52 percent of the respondents 
(Newsru.com, April 14, 2009). People are not interested in the income declarations of particular 
bureaucrats, but 50 percent approve the idea of their publication. 26 percent think that 
bureaucrats will be able to get around the reporting of their income while 15 percent consider 
such measures as a political populism on the side of the government (Nikol’skij, 2009). 
Russians are not very eager to report cases of corruption: 15 percent of the respondents 
did not know who to report, 29 percent would not do this, 22 percent would report to the police, 
7 percent – to the local authorities, 7 percent – to nongovernmental organizations, 10 percent 
would turn to the media, and 11 percent would tell it to the president personally. In an unlikely 
hypothetical case of the disappearance of corruption, 49 percent of Russians expect to solve their 
problems easier, while 12 percent expect more difficulties. 29 percent will not expect any 
changes while 10 percent could not imagine a life without corruption (Mironova, 2009). 
Quantitatively, corruption is a black box. No one knows what share of all the corrupt activities 
are covered in the official statistics. An increase in the number of prosecuted corruptioners may 
indicate a success in the anti-corruption campaign or an increase of the total number of 
corruptioners involved in illicit activities. The same is true with the decrease in these numbers. 
The level of sentenced corruptioners is not a good indicator for any measure of corruption or 
anti-corruption. Police itself found 25 percent less corrupt officers among its people in 2008, 
compared to 2007. The Attorney General does not believe that this decline indicates higher 
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standards of integrity in the police. Rather, it is a result of the less active work of the Internal 
Security Department (Newsru.com, May 5, 2009). 
One of the arguments used to support the idea of sharp and significant output decline in 
the countries of the former Soviet Bloc is that the high level of corruption in transition 
economies has a negative impact on production and productivity. We will turn to statistical data 
to test such a statement. The level of business-related corruption in the Commonwealth of 
Independent States and Central and Eastern Europe in 2002 is presented in Table 1. The percent 
of managers who consider corruption the major obstacle for the business and entrepreneurial 
activities is considered an indicator of the negative impact of corruption on production. The data 
is obtained during the survey conducted in the NIS and CEE in 2003. 
 
Table 1 
Business-related corruption in NIS and CEE, 2002* 
Country Indicator Country Indicator Country Indicator 
Armenia 
Azerbaijan 
Belarus 
Bulgaria 
Croatia 
Czech Republic 
Estonia 
Georgia 
13.5 
19.5 
17.9 
25.4 
22.5 
12.5 
 5.4 
35.1 
Hungary 
Kazakhstan 
Kyrgyz Republic 
Latvia 
Lithuania 
Moldova 
Poland 
Romania 
8.8 
14.2 
31.4 
11.7 
15.6 
40.2 
27.6 
34.9 
Russia 
Serbia 
Slovak Republic 
Slovenia 
Tajikistan 
Ukraine 
Uzbekistan 
 
13.7 
16.3 
27.5 
 6.1 
21.0 
27.8 
 8.7 
Source: World Development Indicators. Retrieved from the database in August 10, 2006. 
Cited from Osipian (2009j, p. 112). 
* Data for Kyrgyz Republic, Moldova, Poland, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan are for 2003. 
 
 
According to the data presented in Table 1, the level of corruption in business and the 
relationship between business and state in Russia is at the lower end of the scale for the region 
overall. Moldova is a leader in corruption, while in Estonia, Slovenia, and Hungary the level of 
10 
 
corruption is relatively low as compared to the region’s average. Needless to say, data on 
corruption are always to a large extent subjective, partial, and biased. Nevertheless, they should 
be taken into consideration when there is a lack of better sources of information. 
The issue of slowing down economic growth due to an increase in corruption is still open. 
While a positive correlation between the high level of corruption and output decline has been 
proven theoretically, strong systematic empirical evidence has yet to be shown. Correlation of 
the GDP per capita growth and estimates of corruption made by the businessmen in the NIS and 
CEE countries of the former socialist bloc in 2002 is presented as a diagram in Figure 1. 
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Figure 1. Correlation of the GDP per capita growth and estimates of corruption made by 
the businessmen in the NIS and CEE countries of the former Socialist Bloc, 2002. 
 
The diagram shows that there is no clear evidence of a positive correlation between the 
level of corruption and output decline or GDP growth slowdown. In Moldova GDP per capita 
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growth of 8 percent in 2002 was possible with the level of corruption marked at 40.2. In Slovenia 
during the same year GDP per capita growth was only 3 percent, with the level of corruption at 
6.1. In Russia, GDP per capita growth of around 5 percent in 2002 coexisted with the level of 
corruption of 13.7, while in Ukraine the same level of GDP per capita growth related to the level 
of corruption of 27.5 on the offered scale. 
 
Education corruption in Russia 
Definition of education corruption includes the abuse of authority for material gain 
(Anechiarico & Jacobs, 1995a, 1995b). Sayed and Bruce (1998) and Waite and Allen (2003) 
present a broad social approach to define corruption. Petrov and Temple (2004) apply a narrow 
definition of corruption that regards corruption as such only if it implies illegality. Corruption in 
higher education may be defined as a system of informal relations established to regulate 
unsanctioned access to material and nonmaterial assets through abuse of the office of public or 
corporate trust (Osipian, 2007a, p. 315). Contrary to the common belief, transparency in the area 
of education corruption in Russia is of a high level and cases of corruption are reported in the 
media (Osipian, 2007e, 2008f). 
Russian secondary and higher education suffers of corruption, as do national educational 
sectors of other former Soviet republics (Osipian, 2007d, 2008c, 2009i; Round and Rodgers, 
2009). The Department of Economic Security of the Ministry of the Interior conducted the 
annual operation “Education 2008” with the following results: almost 200 university faculty and 
administrators are charged with embezzlement and bribery. There are 217 criminal investigations 
launched out of 3.5 thousand crimes registered. Of those 3.5 thousand crimes almost 600 are 
bribery and almost 900 are embezzlement for a total of $3 million (Nazarets, 2008). Faculty 
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members are prosecuted and sentenced for bribery, but often they receive terms on parole. They 
are considered as no threat to the society, since their crimes are non-violent. A faculty member in 
Perm State Agricultural Academy was sentenced to three years and six month on parole for 
bribery. He set a price of $100 for the examination and managed to collect $2500 in bribes from 
25 students in July of 2008. The court also banned the faculty from teaching for three years 
(Ivanova, 2009). Two faculty members were arrested for bribery in Oil and Gas University in 
Tyumen, a large city in Siberia that stands on oil. In first case it was an extortion of only $40 in 
exchange for a positve examination grade. In the second case it was a sum of $1000 collected 
from several students (Leonidov, 2009). 
In the Russian system of higher education, the corrupt relations in the education sector 
are quite complex, because the government comes into play as the major financier and regulator 
of secondary and higher education. The system is highly centralized with both public and private 
colleges being regulated by the government. This means that a case of embezzlement or misuse 
of college property by the college administrator constitutes an act of corruption by way of 
abusing public trust. The public through the government entrusts the college administration with 
proper management and financial operations. In case of a corrupt faculty, the abuse of public 
trust occurs not only in terms of assigning a higher grade with no academic merit, but in terms of 
misusing governmental financing, since half of college students are funded with Russian 
taxpayers’ money. At this stage, there is no need for the leading role of the government in higher 
education. There are enough places in universities to accommodate all those who want to receive 
higher education and to meet the demand of business for qualified workforce. It is assumed that 
private colleges can provide higher education services more effectively and efficiently. This 
assumption is based on the generally accepted premise that private enterprises in the market 
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system operate more effectively and efficiently than do public ones. There is no need to collect 
and redistribute values through the tax system, governmental budget, and access regulations. 
Nevertheless, the government continues to own and regulate public universities and regulate 
private colleges. 
 
Table 2 
 
Everyday corruption market characteristics in the Russian education sector, 2001 and 2005 
 
Indicator Secondary 
education 
Higher 
education 
2001 2005 2001 2005 
Supply of and demand for corrupt services:  
Corruption risk (risk to be subjected to corruption) 13.2 41.0 36.0 52.1
Corruption demand (readiness to bribe) 76.2 60.8 66.7 63.2
Dynamics of everyday corruption markets’ annual volumes:  
Market size, million USD 70.1 92.4 449.4 583.4
Total market share 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.2
Dynamics of the average bribe amount (in rubles) by sector:  
Value 1238.0 2312.0 4305.0 3869.0
Rank* 7.0 8.0 2.0 4.0
Change, percent - 1.6 - -0.2
Corruption intensity within corruption markets:  
Value 2.2 0.9 0.8 0.9
Rank** 1.0 5.0 10.0 6.0
Change, percent - 2.2 - -0.3
Demand on public services in corrupt markets (percent):  
Value 6.1 2.9 8.1 7.4
Rank*** 9.0 12.0 4.0 6.0
Change, percent - -52.5 - -8.6
School: corruption needed in order to enter the school and to finish successfully, education 
process 
Higher education institution: corruption needed in order to enter college, transfer to another 
college, pass course examinations, midterms, term papers, theses, etc. 
* The rank 1 is assigned to the sector based on the largest average bribe 
** The rank 1 is assigned to the market with the most intensified corruption activities 
*** The rank 1 is assigned to the segment of the public services market with the highest demand 
Source: Composed from: Corruption Process in Russia: Level, Structure, Trends. In G. Satarov 
(Ed.). Diagnostics of Corruption in Russia: 2001-2005. INDEM 
Foundation. http://www.indem.ru/en/publicat/2005diag_engV.htm. Cited from Osipian (2009j, p. 
98). 
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Table 2 presents data on everyday corruption market characteristics in the Russian education 
sector in 2001 and 2005. According to the data, the demand on bribes from the side of educators is 
growing, as does average size of a bribe. According to the survey, conducted by the Center for 
Public Opinion Research in 2004, diminished accessibility to free education and medical help is 
pointed out by 23 percent of Russians as the greatest problem, 55 percent consider bureaucracy 
and corruption among the present political and economic elite as the major contributing factor 
that prevents Russia from getting out of socio-economic crisis and achieving economic 
prosperity (Kofanova & Petukhov, 2006, p. 24). 
The increasing gap between pay rates in private and public sectors of the economy urges 
public employees to seek other sources of income (Gorodnichenko and Sabirianova, 2006). 
Along with the health services industry, higher education in Russia has become one of the 
industries, most affected by corruption. Surprisingly, 54 percent of Russians believe that harsher 
punishment for bribery may stop faculty members from accepting or extorting bribes 
(Agranovich, 2008). A rapid development of higher education, its partial privatization and 
increasing flow of financial resources have created a base for corruption. University faculty 
accept bribes and numerous other illicit benefits and utilizing their privileged position and 
control over the access to higher education. 
The higher education sector cannot stay outside the mainstream of development and has 
to operate in changing socio-economic conditions. Accordingly, corruption becomes part of the 
education sector, as it is of other sectors of the economy and the government. The hypothetical 
evolution of corrupt hierarchies in universities points to changing internal structures shaped by 
external influences of the market and the government (Osipian, 2007b, 2008b). The ruling 
regime may be interested in corrupt universities as objects of blackmail, coercion, and control 
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(Darden, 2008; Osipian, 2008e). The nexus of political graft and education corruption that may 
be observed in the former Soviet republics includes collusion, compliance, and control (Osipian, 
2008a). Underpaid educators are more susceptible to corruption. The regime uses educators’ 
need for illicit benefits to create the “feed from the service” scheme and to control the agenda in 
universities (Osipian, 2007d, 2009a). The regime might be interested in maintaining corruption 
in education and preserving its functions of financier and regulator of access. 
Corruption in education is more detrimental than typical bureaucratic corruption. 
Corruption in higher education is detrimental to the society for at least three major reasons. First, 
it has a negative impact on the economy and society due to lowering the system’s efficiency, as 
does bureaucratic corruption. Second, as distinct from ordinary bureaucratic corruption, 
corruption in higher education reduces total social welfare of the society because of its negative 
effect on the quality of educational programs and qualifications of college graduates. Finally, 
corruption in education eats away social cohesion, because students learn not only their subject 
matter, but also pervasive ways and practices of corruption. Corruption in higher education 
negatively affects access, quality, and equity. Contrary to expectations, development of a 
substantial private sector in higher education in Russia leads to an increase in corruption. Private 
universities are as corrupt as their public counterparts, which proves that not only public officials 
are susceptible to corruption. 
There are around two million licensed places for freshmen in around 1500 colleges and 
universities in Russia, of which there are 80 percent in public colleges and 20 percent in private 
ones. In addition, there are numerous public community colleges and vocational schools. The 
projections point out that the number of places in universities in Russia, licensed and accredited 
by the government is already higher than the number of candidates willing to pursue college 
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degrees, including distance learning, correspondence programs, re-training, etc. Almost half of 
all the students in public colleges and universities are funded by the government. The admissions 
to governmentally funded places are corrupt. Course grades can also be bought from faculty 
members. Presence of such problems in the nation’s educational system follows from the 
numerous media reports (Osipian, 2008a, 2008f). Doctoral education is also not free of 
corruption, and doctoral dissertations and degrees are available for sale (Osipian, 2009f, 2010). 
Corruption in admissions to governmentally funded places in public universities and 
bribery in academic process may be most explicit, but certainly not the only forms of corruption 
in academia. Forms of corruption, typical for just about any industry, are characteristic of 
education industry as well. Embezzlement of public funds is committed up the hierarchical 
ladder, from student dormitory administrators to heads of colleges and universities (Novaya 
gazeta, May 14, 2009). Facts of embezzlement, fraud, gross waste, misallocation of resources, 
and other corrupt activities are found in colleges and universities throughout the country. 
Bribery, embezzlement, and fraud are not the only dominating forms of corruption in 
higher education. Logrolling in academia is a typical form of latent corruption. Logrolling, as a 
form of corruption, may be widespread in Russian universities. A faculty member in the school 
of journalism can guarantee the admission of a protégé from the school of foreign languages, and 
faculty member in the school of journalism can admit his/her protégé in exchange. This 
exchange of favors can be split in time. Placement in a university may be swapped for a job 
placement. Such an illicit practice in education can be defined as a corrupt education swap. 
Corrupt education swap is a form of education corruption that may be more prevalent than 
monetary transactions, and more preferred too, for the safety reasons. Corrupt education swap 
belongs to the section of latent corruption. It is oftentimes difficult to identify such corrupt swaps 
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in universities and even if identified, they are still difficult to prove and argue their illegality. In 
economic sense, however, corrupt education and placement swaps are not less harmful to the 
economy and society than education corruption where bribes are paid in cash. 
 
Impact of education corruption on economic growth 
There is no direct evidence for Russia that corruption in higher education has a 
significant negative impact on the national economy or the rate of growth. According to 
Klitgaard (1986), elitism and lack of meritocracy in access to higher education and leadership 
positions in some developing countries lead to a decrease in GNP. New empirical studies are 
needed to reflect the modern day realities. Only theory and some comparisons on general 
developmental trends may point to disadvantages that a national economy experiences due to a 
high level corruption in its educational sector. The discussion presented above offers a prediction 
of possible negative impact in the long run, when those with relatively low level of human 
capital will occupy places of more capable individuals. But this may be compensated with the 
years of working experience. 
Corruption is often perceived as a form of rent-seeking behavior. Rent in this case is 
extracted from the monopolistic position, be it a bureaucratic office or a university professorship. 
The rent-seeking behavior in the Russian society is perceived as a norm. Public officials, 
bureaucrats, and public servants attempt to transform their access to material and non-material 
assets into personal benefits. Educators act in a similar manner. Rectors of public universities 
rent out public property, including academic and non-academic facilities and land, to businesses 
in which they often have a share. University faculty sell academic degrees by abusing their 
monopolized function of evaluation of academic progress and conferring the degrees. Unlike in 
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amny other societies, the rent-seeking behavior in Russia extends far beyond state bureaucracy, 
bublic healthcare and education sectors. Public sector is not the only area of rent extraction by 
the bureaucrats and civil servants. The etire national economy suffers of heavy dependency on 
rent extraction from the rich antural resources. With a significant and continuing increase in 
prices on oil, gas and other resourses, Russians consider rent-seeking not only as a form of 
bureaucratic behavior, by the way the economy works. 
The process of massification of higher education is driven by two fundamentals: 
development of production and social development (Dye, 1966; Lindeen and Willis, 1975; 
Volkwein and Malik, 1997). The national economy presents demand on the skilled labor, i.e. 
human capital, produced in universities (Marshall and Tucker, 1992). Russian government 
represents interests of producers and so its function is to supply skilled labor to businesses by 
maintaining the system of public education. The economy requires the productive resource 
“human capital” at the minimum cost. Hence, the task of the government is to maximize the 
effectiveness and efficiency of public higher education. It may be done on the basis of market 
reforms, dismantling of the vertical axis of subordination, and balancing university autonomy 
with its accountability to the government. 
Discussions of the nature and function of Russian education point to such priorities as 
upbringing (Nikandrov, 2007) and development of civic values and patriotism (Gavriliuk and 
Malenkov, 2004). Value orientations of contemporary youth include friends, health, interesting 
work, and money (Semenov, 2007). According to the results of the survey of students conducted 
in four universities in St. Petersburg in 2005, “when it comes to prestige, the leading professions 
are economist (37 percent) and lawyer (36 percent), with the lowest rankings going to 
schoolteacher and blue-collar worker (1 percent each). At the same time, when it comes to the 
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social significance of occupations, the ratings are different, with medical specialist (45 percent) 
and schoolteacher (36 percent) at the top.” (Semenov, 2008) This points out to a certain 
differential between the personal and societal orientations on social capital and human capital. 
Our suggestion is to introduce more market relations and lessen governmental control in 
the higher education sector. This new balance can only be achieved through further restructuring, 
privatization, plurality of forms of property and economic activities. Unfortunately, all of these 
changes can be made primarily by the government. The government, however, may not be 
interested in such changes (Osipian, 2008a, 2008e). The leading role of the government in the 
education reform should be supplemented by the popular support. If explained clearly and 
without bias to the population, the reform is likely to be supported by the majority of the 
population. One may suggest more participatory strategies, more public control, more political 
activism, broader initiatives on transparency and accountability, civil society, participatory 
decision making in regard of taxes, etc. Taxes should be reduced if higher education becomes for 
a fee. Such a change in the pattern of redistribution may be appealing to the public. 
Little can be done to reduce education corruption in the short run. The measures that 
target corruption on the functional level, such as transparency and code of conduct, are not 
enough. Structural changes, organizational changes, and institutional changes are needed to resist 
corruption in education. These are, however, unlikely to be implemented from the top. Structural 
and institutional changes can only evolve naturally, based on technological changes and demands 
of societal production. Organizational changes may be made voluntarily, but only in the short run. 
In the long run, if proven irrelevant, they will disappear or transform to a mere formality. 
Organizational and structural changes are possible as secondary measures to reduce 
corruption. Each of the faculty members has a monopolistic power over a certain course. 
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Graduation requires a set of passes and grades on the sequence of courses, taken over five years. 
Thus, the bureaucratic system that exists in Russian universities can be defined as a sequential 
model. Certain rules apply for maximization of illicit profits in such systems and certain patterns 
of behavior among dishonest faculty members may be observed. According to Rose-Ackerman 
(1978), “The sequential model is identical to the fragmented except that applicants must have the 
portions of their petition approved in a particular order. No bureaucrat in the sequence, however, 
ever reviews the choices made by officials who have already acted. These two models, then, best 
describe procedures in which each functionary behaves like an independent, specialized expert.” 
(p. 169) The real structure of corrupt relations in academia is much more complex and often 
involves rigid hierarchical structures (Osipian, 2009d). Rose-Ackerman (1978) addresses the 
hierarchy as one of the forms of bureaucratic structure, but in Osipian (2009h), hierarchical 
structures are presented as ones of corruption. Vertical hierarchies, thus, are not one step further, 
but a different, parallel line of investigation. 
Agranovich (2008) reports that in 2008 49 percent of Russians believed that in order to 
enter a college one has to pay a bribe. According to the data from VCIOM, in 2006 61 percent of 
Russians believed in the necessity to bribe for the access to higher education. Provost of the New 
School of Economics, Grigory Kantorovich, says that a certain role in such a decline played the 
introduction of the standardized test as the major tool for the college admissions process. This 
test presumably eliminated the direct connection between the professor and the candidate in the 
admissions process. Kantorovich’s ideas about the elimination of corruption in the admissions 
process in the New School of Economics stay within the limits of simple technical and 
procedural innovations. He suggests that two thirds of all the graft is collected not in admissions, 
but during the studies and graduation (Agranovich, 2008). Entry examinations are taken by well-
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prepared students from other universities. Such impersonations are illegal, but there are ways of 
avoiding prosecution for such misconduct. The standardized test reduced significantly 
impersonations on entry examinations, but the system of academic Olympiads developed and 
widened significantly as an alternative to the test now becomes rotten with impersonators. 
Osipian (2007c, 2009b) reports that the standardized test experiences numerous problems and is 
unlikely to solve the problem of corruption in higher education even at the entrance stage. 
Following the universities, secondary schools also become riddled with petty corruption. For 
instance, in Tomilino, a town near Moscow, a school principal was caught red-handed for 
bribery. A 65 year old principal extorted $350 from the parent of a prospective student in 
exchange for enrollment to school (Vesti, February 11, 2009). In appears that the entrance to 
secondary education also becomes corrupt despite a well-developed universal and compulsory 
system of secondary education. 
Test based admissions are admissions to universities on competitive basis, based on the 
results of independently administered computer graded examinations or standardized tests. These 
are anticipated to become a major tool in fighting corruption in admissions. The introduction of 
standardized tests, even if proven successful in reducing corruption in access to higher education, 
does not represent fundamental changes. The test-based admissions and vouchers as replacement 
for the university-based entry examinations and direct governmental funding means preservation 
of the same system when the government retains the distribution function. Under such a system, 
corruption is unlikely to decline, even in the long run. In order to remove the government as an 
intermediary and the distributor, direct governmental funding should be replaced almost entirely 
with the consumer payments. Income-based inequality should be compensated for with 
educational loans. Educational loans should come as a combination of governmental and private 
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bank credits. The reform of education financing alone will not result in the change of the system. 
The reform should include privatization or at least a long term lease of universities. Privatization 
of public universities should include privatization of land. This will allow universities to raise 
funds for investment in university facilities, equipment, libraries, faculty salaries, scholarships 
for most promising students with low income, and research. While the issue of property rights 
delineation is fundamental, the tests are crucially important for successful reforms (Osipian, 
2008d, p. 101). Decentralized educational systems with a large private sector, such as the one in 
the US, are also not free of corruption (Osipian, 2009c, 2009g), but they may better fit modern 
Russia. 
Property distribution through vouchers, and auction based sale of public enterprises 
focused on creation of open joint-stock companies did not bring expected results; property 
distribution is characterized by high inequalities, not to mention social injustice and the 
accompanying tensions. The idea of making individuals stock-holders has yet to come to life. 
Privatization did not work socially, but the development of the stock market may help. The stock 
market may involve additional resources, currently held by the population, into production. 
Economic reforms were initiated by the government, but the bureaucrats seek to strengthen their 
positions and gain more control and more property rights. Accordingly, the two fundamentals 
that still need further development are democracy and private property. 
Education corruption and growth may be linked through human capital, and placing value 
on human capital under different conditions. Transition from the Soviet to post-Soviet reality 
touches on the higher education sector. During the Soviet times, the major stake for individuals 
was gaining higher education. Jobs were available for everyone, and higher education was not a 
“must” for those seeking placement. There was no unemployment in the country and in fact 
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people were not allowed to be unemployed. There was criminal persecution of idle people 
predetermined in the laws. There were some disincentives embedded in the system of education 
and employment that worked as regulators or stabilizers: low salaries for educated people kept 
many away from universities and lowered the demand on higher education. State monopoly on 
all the sectors of the economy led to the fact that wages were set by the government. As a result 
of low wages for educated professionals, many engineers worked as skilled workers and earned 
twice as much plus had better benefits, including faster housing and cars. There was no labor 
market in the country in its classical understanding. 
In the post-transition economy, massive renovation of production capacities requires 
investment in principal capital and human capital that would be able to invent and use new 
technologies, operate the machines, and manage complex technological processes. It is 
misleading to assume that since the Soviet times, there was plenty of human capital starting 
1970s. But this assumption is still being made as a result of high unemployment, especially 
among technical cadres, during the 1990s. As a consequence, the major focus now is on the 
future investment in principal capital. However, human capital can soon become a limited 
resource, with qualified specialists being in short supply. Market economies are socially complex 
systems. Socially complex societies are naturally low productive. In order to realize their 
potential advantage over the more simple planned economies, complex societies need a sufficient 
quantity of human capital not only of technical, but of social expertise as well. This will include 
economists, lawyers, managers, accountants, and such. 
In micro-perspective, the major stake in contemporary Russia is not higher education, but 
the job. More and more often, education becomes a necessary formality, such as a diploma to 
occupy a certain job place, and can be bought. Corruption in higher education allows for 
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circumventing formal requirements for gaining a degree. This situation may change only in one 
case: if a growing competition between producers will make the need for higher effectiveness 
stronger, and employers will start seeking human capital. In the current situation, the existing 
level of nepotism, cronyism, preferential treatment, and sometimes outright bribery dictate, in 
part, employment decisions. Such practices result in an undeveloped labor market. In many 
instances, high level human capital is undervalued and its bearers, i.e. highly skilled and 
motivated professionals, are underpriced or artificially made low-competitive. Meritocracy and 
talent suffer, while low professionalism gains way. 
Massive education offers plenty of high quality, affordable, and accessible education. But 
in addition to honest ways, one can obtain diplomas in exchange for bribes. With broader 
introduction of for tuition programs, when payments for education are made legally, corruption 
in admissions will inevitably decline. Corruption, however, is not limited to admissions to 
governmentally funded places, but continues in the academic process through the program of 
study. One of the real solutions to academic corruption will be further development of the labor 
market, when knowledge obtained in universities, whether paid for by the government or by 
tuition, will be valued higher than personal connections, bribes, and other illicit benefits. A weak 
undeveloped labor market pools back the nation’s otherwise dynamically developing economy. 
The process of economic transformation from planned to market economy is 
characterized by the transition from full employment to unemployment. In the Soviet times, 
planned economy employed the entire available workforce. The predominantly extensive nature 
of economic growth explained full employment at that period. In the market economies, full 
employment is rather a continuing goal to be achieved than a reality. Accordingly, market 
reforms and a decline in production led to economic restructuring and unemployment. 
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The illicit ways to receive jobs include nepotism, cronyism, personal connections, and 
bribes. They are similar to the illicit forms of gaining access to publicly funded higher education. 
There are two consequences of such realities: a significant portion of human capital is of unclear 
value; the high quality human capital is often undervalued and not utilized in societal production 
at full capacity. Distribution of property rights on production capacities, including plants and 
mines is skewed and concentrated in the hands of few. This is a result of corrupt privatization of 
public enterprises of 1990s. This is especially important since Ukrainian economy remains 
industry oriented, rather than predominantly service oriented, and rightly so. We argued earlier 
that this is a better structure for the national economy. Low competition between the producers 
means no need for the best and brightest. Unequal distribution of property rights on production 
capacities eventually results in undervalued human capital. 
Even competition between the employers does not place the real value and the accent on 
human capital. Employers need a diploma holder who can do the job for the lowest possible 
wage. The diploma is needed as a part of the risk aversion strategy, typical for the job market, or 
in order to satisfy some formal requirements. The result is that employees cannot do the job 
properly. They are ineffective. Employers no longer rely on diplomas; in addition to degree 
certificates, they prefer working experience as a guaranty of qualifications. Preferential treatment 
in higher education and employment may correlate positively. Those with means to buy places in 
prestigious public universities are likely to obtain better job placements by the same way of 
bribing and using kinship and personal connection. At this stage, these are no longer speculations 
but rather hypotheses that will have to be tested in the future research. 
The property rights on the principal capital are in the hands of few. These few are rich 
enough to profit on the size of the enterprise rather than on its effective organization and high 
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level of productivity. They do not run for the highest effectiveness and efficiency possible. They 
accumulate large profits thanks to their size, not to the effectiveness of their work. They can 
afford lavish lifestyle now. Initial monopolistic structure of the economy inherited from the 
Soviet times, emphasis on machine building and heavy industry, and poorly designed and 
implemented de-nationalization and privatization resulted in the high degree of monopolization, 
oligopolies, and low competition. A weak need for being competitive, as well as the strong 
tradition of non-economic solutions for economic problems, including through mafia, collusions, 
and illicit business-government relations, lead to low effectiveness and efficiency. 
 
Conclusion 
As can be seen from the discussion, high levels of education corruption may harm total 
factor productivity in the long run, primarily through lowering the level of human capital and 
slowing down the pace of its accumulation. Ethical standards learned in the process of training in 
universities can also affect the standards of practice in different professions. The growing level 
of productivity is not likely to reduce education corruption in the short run, but can eventually 
lead to implementation of higher ethical standards in the education sector. This may happen 
through the chain of incentives emerging at every stage of the process of creation and utilization 
of human capital. To simplify, the growing complexity of technological processes will demand 
higher amount of human capital, including human capital per capita. This will change the 
characteristics of the labor force in demand. The labor market will send the signal to the 
education sector and to the future employees. As a result, both producers of educational services 
and those investing in their human capital will demand high quality education rather than bribe 
their way to educational certificates. 
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It is unlikely that education corruption defines or influences the structure of the Russian 
economy. Such explicit manifestations of corruption in the higher education sector as diploma 
mills are presented in the form of distant branches of colleges and universities. Their total 
revenue is insignificant as are their enrollments and they do not occupy a significant niche in the 
sector. Changes in the structure of the national economy can reduce corruption in higher 
education due to the demand on qualified work force and competitiveness of firms. An increase 
in competition due to the decreasing concentration of property rights and more even distribution 
of property rights on principal capital will eventually accentuate human capital over 
governmentally supported educational certificates. Decentralization and restructuring of the 
Russian higher education sector diminishes the role of the government. University autonomy 
may be needed to replace weakening governmental control. Meritocracy and high social prestige 
of academic profession and university degrees slowly weakens. This indicates the process of 
erosion of values, common for the transition society overall. Forgeries will eventually be 
annihilated by their overwhelming number. If the situation will develop in an unregulated, 
unorganized way, the university degree will become absurdist. Reputation of each degree and 
degree holder will be based on his/her academic merits and reputation of the granting university. 
Competitive labor market will place accents on values of academic degrees and human capital. 
 
References 
Agranovich, M. (2008). Podstava na ekzamene: kazhdyj vtoroj rossiyanin ubezhden, chto 
postupit’ v vuz mozhno tol’ko s pomoshch’yu vzyatki [Impersonators on the test: every 
second Russian is certain that the only way to enter a university is through bribes]. 
28 
 
pdf 
Rossiyskaya gazeta, №4736, August 26, 2008. Retrieved July 5, 2009, from 
http://www.rg.ru/2008/08/26/kantorovich.html 
Anechiarico, F. & Jacobs, J. (1995a). The Pursuit of Absolute Integrity: How Corruption Control 
Makes Government Ineffective. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. 
Anechiarico, F., & Jacobs, J. (1995b). Panopticism and Financial Controls: The Anticorruption 
Project in Public Administration. Crime, Law and Social Change, 22, pp. 361-379. 
Bellver, A., & Kaufmann, D. (2005). Transparenting Transparency: Initial Empirics and Policy 
Applications. World Bank Policy Research Working Paper. Washington, DC. 
Besançon, M. (2003). Good Governance Rankings: The Art of Measurement. World Peace 
Foundation Report 36, Washington, D.C. Retrieved October 1, 2008, from 
doi: http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTWBIGOVANTCOR/Resources/wpf36govern
ance.
Bol’shinstvo rossiyan ravnodushno otneslis’ k deklaratsiyam chinovnikov: ih ne interesuyut 
chuzhie dohody [The majority of Russians ignored income declarations of public 
bureaucrats: They are not interested in others’ incomes]. Newsru.com, April 14, 2009. 
Retrieved July 5, 2009, from http://www.newsru.com/russia/14apr2009/opros.html 
Darden, K. (2008). The Integrity of Corrupt States: Graft as an Informal State Institution, Politics 
& Society, 36(1), pp. 35-59. 
Dye, T. (1966). Politics, Economics, and the Public. Chicago: Rand McNally. 
Gavriliuk, V., & Malenkov, V. (2004). Grazhdanstvennost’, patriotism i vospitanie molodezhi 
[Civic-mindedness, patriotism, and upbringing of young people]. Sotsiologicheskie 
issledovaniya, 4, pp. 44-50. 
29 
 
tml 
tml 
Genprokuror nashel glavnyh vzyatochnikov v Rossii: eto uchetelya, militsionery i vrachi [The 
Attorney General found major corruptioners in Russia: these are teachers, policemen, and 
doctors]. Newsru.com, May 5, 2009. Retrieved July 5, 2009, 
from http://www.newsru.com/russia/05may2009/chaikacorrupt.h
Glaeser, E., La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., & Schleifer, A. (2004). Do Institutions Cause 
Growth? Journal of Economic Growth, 9(3), pp. 271-303. 
Gong, T. (1997). Forms and characteristics of China’s corruption in the 1990s: with continuity. 
Communist and Post-Communist Studies, 30(3), pp. 277-288. 
Gong, T. (2002). Dangerous collusion: corruption as a collective venture in contemporary China. 
Communist and Post-Communist Studies, 35(1), pp. 85-103. 
Gorodnichenko, Y., & Sabirianova, K. (2006). Public Sector Pay and Corruption: Measuring 
Bribery from Micro Data. Paper submitted to the NEUDC annual conference, Ithaca, NY. 
Ivanova, O. (2009). Permskij prepodavatel’-vzyatochnik poluchil 3 goda i 6 mesyatsev uslovno 
[A faculty member in Perm’ was sentenced to three years and six month on parole for 
bribery]. Novy Region, March 6, 2009. Retrieved July 5, 2009, 
from http://www.nr2.ru/perm/223301.h
Kaufmann, D. (2005). Myths and Realities of Governance and Corruption. Social Science 
Research Network SSRN, doi: http://ssrn.com/abstract=829244. Accessed October 1, 
2008. 
Kaufmann, D., Hellman, J., Jones, G., & Schankerman, M., (2000). Measuring Governance, 
Corruption, and State Capture: How Firms and Bureaucrats Shape the Business 
Environment in Transition Economies. World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 
30 
 
197 
tml 
2312. Social Science Research Network SSRN, doi: http://ssrn.com/abstract=236214. 
Accessed October 1, 2008. 
Kaufmann, D., & Kraay, A. (2003). Governance Matters III: New Indicators for 1996-2002 and 
Addressing Methodological Challenges. The World Bank Institute Working Papers, 
Washington, D.C.: The World Bank. 
Kaufmann, D., & Vicente, P. (2005). Legal Corruption. Social Science Research Network SSRN. 
doi: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=829844&rec=1&srcabs=829244. 
Accessed October 1, 2008. 
Klitgaard, R. (1986). Elitism and Meritocracy in Developing Countries. Baltimore: John 
Hopkins University Press. 
Klitgaard, R. (1988) Controlling Corruption. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California 
Press. 
Kofanova, E., & Petukhov, V. (2006). Public Opinion of Corruption in Russia. Russian Social 
Science Review, 47(6), pp. 23-45. 
Kornya, A., Holmogorova, V., & Nikol’skij, A. (2009). Nezavisimo ot ekonomiki [Independent 
of the economy]. Vedomosti, 80(2350), May 5, 2009. Retrieved July 5, 2009, 
from http://www.vedomosti.ru/newspaper/article.shtml?2009/05/05/194
Lancaster, T., & Montinola, G. (1997). Toward a Methodology for the Comparative Study of 
Political Corruption. Crime, Law & Social Change, 27(3-4), pp. 185-206. 
Leonidov, A. (2009). Vzyatki v vuzah: den’gi, podarki i intim [Bribes in HEIs: money, gifts and 
sex]. 72.ru, February 11, 2009. Retrieved July 5, 2009, 
from http://72.ru/business/61509.h
31 
 
tml 
Lindeen, J., & Willis, G. (1975). Political, Socio-economic, and Demographic Patterns of 
Support for Public Higher Education. Western Political Quarterly, 28, pp. 528-541. 
Lipset, S. (1960). Political Man: The Social Basis of Modern Politics. New York: Doubleday. 
Marshall, R., & Tucker, M. (1992). Thinking for a Living: Education and the Wealth of Nations. 
New York: Basic Books. 
Medvedev vser’ez vzyalsya za korruptsiyu: skryvayushchih dohody chinovnikov budut 
bezzhalostno uvol’nyat’ [Medvedev took on corruption seriously: bureaucrats who hide 
their incomes will be fired immediately]. Newsru.com, March 10, 2009. Retrieved July 5, 
2009, from http://www.newsru.com/russia/10mar2009/corrupt_gos.html 
Mironova, Y. (2009). Vorovat’ ne nado zabyvat’: Rossiyane vidyat horoshie storony korruptsii 
[Do not forget to steal: Russians see benefits of corruption]. Vremya, April 28, 2009. 
Retrieved July 5, 2009, from http://vremya.ru/2009/73/4/228116.html 
Nachal’nik Baltijskogo voenno-morskogo institute lishilsya dolzhnosti [Head of Baltic Naval 
Institute lost his office]. Novaya gazeta, May 14, 2009. Retrieved July 4, 2009, 
from http://www.novayagazeta.ru/news/537424.h
Nazarets, Y. (2008). Korruptsiya v vuzah: berut mnogo, no po chut’-chut’ [Corruption in HEIs: 
take a lot, but little by little]. Radio Svoboda, December 12, 2008. Retrieved July 5, 2009, 
from http://www.svobodanews.ru/content/article/476731.html 
Nikandrov, N. (2007). Vospitanie i sotsializatsiya v sovremennoj Rossii: riski i vozmozhnosti 
[Upbringing and socialization in contemporary Russia: risks and opportunities]. 
Pedagogika, 1, pp. 3-14. 
Nikol’skij, A. (2009). Interesen Putin i Zhirinonskij: grazhdanam malointeresny deklaratsii 
otdel’nyh chinovnikov, no samu ideyu ih publikatsii oni odobryayut [Of interest are Putin 
32 
 
08. 
008. 
and Zhirinonskij: people are not interested in the income declarations of particular 
bureaucrats, but they approve the idea of their publication]. Vedomosti, №66 (2336), 
April 14, 2009. Retrieved July 5, 2009, from 
http://www.vedomosti.ru/newspaper/article.shtml?2009/04/14/191074 
Osipian, A. (2007a). Corruption in Higher Education: Conceptual Approaches and Measurement 
Techniques. Research in Comparative and International Education, 2(4), pp. 313-332. 
Osipian, A. (2007b). Corruption Hierarchies in Education in Developing and Transition 
Societies. In D. Thompson and F. Crampton (Eds.), UCEA Conference Proceedings for 
Convention 2007, doi: http://coe.ksu.edu/ucea/2007/Osipian1_UCEA2007.pdf Accessed 
October 1, 2008. 
Osipian, A. (2007c). Replacing University Entry Examinations with Standardized Tests in 
Russia: Will It Reduce Corruption? In D. Thompson and F. Crampton (Eds.), UCEA 
Conference Proceedings for Convention 2007, 
doi: http://coe.ksu.edu/ucea/2007/Osipian2_UCEA2007.pdf Accessed October 1, 20
Osipian, A. (2007d). “Feed from the Service”: Corruption and Coercion in the State—University 
Relations. Annual Conference of the Central Eurasian Studies Society (CESS, Harvard), 
University of Washington, Seattle, WA, 17 October, 2007. The Education Resources 
Information Center (ERIC), US Department of Education, 
doi: http://www.eric.ed.gov/ERICDocs/data/ericdocs2sql/content_storage_01/0000019b/
80/3f/98/a8.pdf Accessed October 1, 2
Osipian, A. (2007e). Higher Education Corruption in Ukraine: Opinions and Estimates. 
International Higher Education, 49, pp. 21-22. 
33 
 
008. 
8. 
Osipian, A. (2008a). Political Graft and Education Corruption in Ukraine: Compliance, 
Collusion, and Control. Demokratizatsiya: The Journal of Post-Soviet Democratization, 
16(4), pp. 323-344. 
Osipian, A. (2008b). Corruption in Higher Education: Does it Differ Across the Nations and 
Why? Research in Comparative and International Education, 3(4), pp. 345-365. 
Osipian, A. (2008c). Book Review of Corrupt Schools, Corrupt Universities: What Can Be 
Done? Paris: Institute for International Educational Planning by Jacques Hallak and 
Muriel Poisson. Canadian and International Education Journal, 37(2), pp. 99-101. 
Osipian, A. (2008d). Corruption and Coercion: University Autonomy versus State Control. 
European Education: Issues and Studies, 40(3), pp. 27-48. 
Osipian, A. (2008e). Misdeeds in the US Higher Education: Illegality versus Corruption. The 
Education Resources Information Center (ERIC), US Department of Education. 
doi: http://www.eric.ed.gov/ERICDocs/data/ericdocs2sql/content_storage_01/0000019b/
80/3c/85/2f.pdf Accessed December 31, 2
Osipian, A. (2008f). Corruption in Russian Higher Education as Reflected in the Media. Social 
Science Research Network (SSRN), 
doi: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1087612 Accessed December 
31, 200
Osipian, A. (2009a). “Feed from the Service”: Corruption and Coercion in the State—University 
Relations in Central Eurasia. Research in Comparative and International Education, 4(2), 
pp. 182-203. 
34 
 
Osipian, A. (2009b). Vouchers, Tests, Loans, Privatization: Will They Help Tackle Corruption in 
Russian Higher Education? Prospects: Quarterly Review of Comparative Education, 
39(1), forthcoming. 
Osipian, A. (2009c). Investigating Corruption in American Higher Education: The Methodology. 
FedUni Journal of Higher Education, May, 4(2), pp. 49-81. 
Osipian, A. (2009d). Corruption Hierarchies in Higher Education in the Former Soviet Bloc. 
International Journal of Educational Development, 29(3), pp. 321-330. 
Osipian, A. (2009e). Corruption in the Higher Education Industry: Legal Cases in the Context of 
Change. Annual Conference of the University Council for Education Administration, 
Anaheim, CA, November 2009. 
Osipian, A. (2009f). Le Bourgeois Gentilhomme: Political Corruption of Russian Doctorates. 
Annual Meeting of the American Sociological Association, San Francisco, CA, August 
2009. 
Osipian, A. (2009g). Grey Areas in the Higher Education Sector Finance: Illegality versus 
Corruption. Annual Meeting of the American Education Finance Association, Nashville, 
TN, March, 2009. 
Osipian, A. (2009h). Corrupt Organizational Hierarchies in the Former Soviet Bloc. Transition 
Studies Review, 16(3), forthcoming. 
Osipian, A. (2009i). Corruption and Reform in Higher Education in Ukraine. Canadian and 
International Education Journal, 38(2), forthcoming. 
Osipian, A. (2009j). The Impact of Human Capital on Economic Growth: A Case Study in Post-
Soviet Ukraine, 1989-2009. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 
35 
 
Osipian, A. (2010). Dissertations for Sale: Corruption in Russia’s Doctoral Education. Annual 
Meeting of the American Economic Association, Atlanta, GA, January 2010. 
Petrov, G., & Temple, P. (2004). Corruption in Higher Education: Some Findings from the States 
of the Former Soviet Union. Higher Education Management and Policy, 16(1), pp. 83-99. 
Putin, V. (2009). Postanovlenie ot 5 marta 2009 g. #196 Ob utverzhdenii metodiki provedeniya 
ekspertizy proektov normativnyh pravovyh aktov i inyh dokumentov v tselyah 
vyyavleniya v nih polozhenij, sposobstvuyushchih sozdaniyu uslovij dlya proyavleniya 
korruptsii [The Order # 196 of March 5, 2009, About the methodology of conducting an 
expert examination of the projects of laws and other legal documents with the goal of 
identifying sections and regulations that have a potential to facilitate corruption]. The 
Government of the Russian Federation, March 5, 2009. Retrieved July 5, 2009, from 
http://www.government.ru/content/governmentactivity/insiderfgovernment/archive/2009/
03/10/d2c7c346-6577-499f-b3eb-905d724fec4a.htm 
Round, J. & Rodgers, P. (2009). The Problems of Corruption in Post-Soviet Ukraine's Higher 
Education Sector. International Journal of Sociology, 39(2), pp. 80-95. 
Rose-Ackerman, S. (1978). Corruption: A Study in Political Economy. New York: Academic 
Press. 
Rose-Ackerman, S. (1999). Corruption and Government: Causes, Consequences and Reform. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Rossijskie chinovniki voruyut kak v poslednij den’: ob’emy korruptsii dostigayut $300 mlrd v 
god [Russian bureaucrats steal as if there is the last day coming: the volume of corruption 
reaches $300 billion a year]. Newsru.com, March 17, 2009. Retrieved July 5, 2009, from 
http://www.newsru.com/russia/17mar2009/corrupt.html 
36 
 
tml 
tion. 
tml 
Samofalova, O. (2008). Uroven’ korruptsii v Rossii samyj vysokij za poslednie vosem’ let [Level 
of corruption in Russia is highest in the last eight years]. RB.ru, October 23, 2008. 
Retrieved July 5, 2009, 
from http://www.rb.ru/topstory/economics/2008/10/23/184618.h
Satarov, G. (2006). Corruption Process in Russia: Level, Structure, Trends. In G. Satarov 
(Ed.). Diagnostics of Corruption in Russia: 2001-2005. Moscow: INDEM Founda
Retrieved May 12, 2006, from http://www.indem.ru/en/publicat/2005diag_engV.htm 
Savel’eva, D. (2008). Minyust sostavliaet spisok samyh “vzyatkoemkih” dolzhnostej [The 
Ministry of Justice composes a list of most “corruptible” public offices]. RB.ru, 
December 3, 2008. Retrieved July 5, 2009, from 
http://www.rb.ru/topstory/economics/2008/12/03/102547.html 
Sayed, T., & Bruce, D. (1998). Police Corruption: Towards a Working Definition. African 
Security Review, 7(1), pp. 1. Retrieved May 20, 2002, 
from http://www.iss.co.za/ASR/7No1/SayedBruce.h
Semenov, V. (2007). Tsennostnye orientatsii sovremennoj molodezhi [Value orientations of 
contemporary youth]. Sotsiologicheskie issledovaniya, 4, pp. 37-43. 
Semenov, V. (2008). The Value Orientations of Today’s Young People. Russian Social Science 
Review, 4, pp. 38-52. 
Shleifer, A., & Treisman, D. (2003). A Normal Country. NBER Working Paper 10057. 
Retrieved January 4, 2004, from www.nber.org/papers/w10057 
Solomon, P., & Foglesong, T. (2000). The Two Faces of Crime in Post-Soviet Ukraine. East 
European Constitutional Review, Summer, pp. 72-76. 
37 
 
429 
Svensson, J. (2005). Eight Questions about Corruption. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 19(3), 
pp. 19-42. 
Transparency International (2008), Corruption Perceptions Index. Retrieved October 1, 2008, 
from http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi 
V Tomiline direktor shkoly popalas’ na vzyatke [In Tomilino, a school principal was caught red-
handed for bribery]. Vesti, February 11, 2009. Retrieved July 5, 2009, 
from http://www.vesti.ru/doc.html?id=257
VCIOM: rossiyane tak i ne poverili v gryadushchuyu pobedu nad korruptsiej [VCIOM: Russians 
do not believe in the coming victory over corruption]. Newsru.com, April 28, 2009. 
Retrieved July 5, 2009, from http://www.newsru.com/russia/28apr2009/neveryat.html 
Volkwein, J., & Malik, S. (1997). State Regulation and Administrative Flexibility at Public 
Universities. Research in Higher Education, 38(1), pp. 17-43. 
Waite, D., & Allen, D. (2003). Corruption and Abuse of Power in Educational Administration. 
The Urban Review, 35(4), pp. 281-296. 
Zimring, F., & Johnson, D. (2005). On the Comparative Study of Corruption. British Journal of 
Criminology, pp. 1-17. 
